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Looking Through
Both Ends of the Telescope:
Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court
by DAVID L. FRANKLIN*
Introduction
Consider this statement: Constitutional adjudication is always "asapplied." In other words: the Court's job in any case is nothing more and
nothing less than to determine, on the facts before it, whether the plaintiff is
entitled to the relief she seeks. In a constitutional case, this typically means
determining whether the conduct of the party bringing the challenge is
protected by a valid claim of constitutional right. If the answer is yes, then
the law purporting to regulate that conduct must give way and cannot be
applied to the challenger. In this sense, rights serve as shields behind
which constitutionally protected activities may continue. A ruling that
vindicates a constitutional right, however, does not strike any law--or even
any provision of any law-from the statute books. Whether the challenged
law may validly be applied to other actual or potential challengers, or in
other factual situations, is for future lawyers to argue about and future cases
to decide.
Now consider this statement: Constitutional adjudication is always
"facial." In other words: it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.' In a constitutional case, this
means determining whether the challenger's conduct is regulated by a
constitutionally permissible law.
Courts must ascertain whether a
challenged law is constitutionally permissible by gathering as much
relevant information as they can about the law's purposes and effects, and
then measuring what they find against the applicable doctrinal tests.

*
Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I thank Brad Joondeph, Richard
Primus, Kim Roosevelt, and Steve Siegel for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Errors,
naturally, are mine.
1.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Rights rarely function as shields protecting certain activities; virtually
any conduct can be regulated, provided the regulation is duly authorized
and validly drafted. Constitutional rulings, at least when they are rendered
by appellate courts, always have effects beyond the immediate parties to
the case. The precise breadth of a court's holding in a constitutional case,
as in any other, is for future lawyers to argue about and future cases to
decide.
This Article demonstrates that both of the foregoing statements are
true-or, rather, that we have a constitutional jurisprudence in which each
of the statements is treated as true some of the time. More strongly put:
sometimes the Supreme Court acts as if constitutional adjudication is
always as-applied, and sometimes it acts as if constitutional adjudication is
always facial. Naturally, this state of affairs has occasioned some
frustration and unease among both justices and commentators. Yet, the
frustration and unease, I submit, are the result not of the content of either
vision of constitutional adjudication but of the absolutism with which each
is put forward. Constitutional adjudication is sometimes as-applied and
sometimes facial. It is never always anything.
The problem, of course, is how to define "sometimes." When should
constitutional adjudication be as-applied and when should it be facial?
Scholars have made some headway towards resolving this ambiguity and I
will touch upon a few of these contributions in the pages that follow.
However, the primary focus of this Article will be Supreme Court
jurisprudence over the past half-decade, and particularly the Roberts Court,
which has been in place since the elevation of Justice Alito in January
2006. For its part, the Roberts Court has tended to openly throw its weight
behind the first statement. That is, on most occasions, the Court speaks and
acts as if constitutional adjudication should set its sights narrowly,
proceeding on an as-applied basis except in unusual circumstances-and it
frequently hints that those circumstances are so unusual as to be practically
nonexistent. Yet, on other occasions, though with less fanfare, the Court
sets its sights more broadly, acting on a vision of constitutional
adjudication that treats facial analysis as a (largely unspoken) norm.
Most intriguing of all, several of the Roberts Court's decisions adopt
the language of the as-applied model even as their reasoning pursues the
logic of the facial model. These cases embody what I call "facial
adjudication in as-applied clothing." As we will see, this is a versatile
technique: it has allowed the Court to reject both facial and as-applied
challenges, while ostensibly remaining open to future as-applied
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challenges, 2 and even to signal the future success of all colorable as-applied
challenges while purporting not to disturb precedent that rejects just such
an outcome. 3 Perhaps the most distinctive by-product of this technique has
been what I call facial validation, where the Court upholds a statute not
only against the challenge at bar, but, for all practical purposes, against all
future challenges as well. 4 I will argue that when substantive constitutional
doctrine dictates a focus on attributes like legislative purpose that operate at
the level of the statute itself rather than at the level of discrete applications,
the predictable result is facial adjudication-and that facial adjudication
can produce validations as well as invalidations. By the end of our
exploration of the Court's recent cases, we will have discovered that
substantive doctrine is what drives the justices to look at constitutional
adjudication through both ends of the telescope.
Before proceeding, a note on methods and objectives is in order. I
have deliberately framed the choice between the as-applied and facial
modes as nothing less than a choice between dramatically opposed visions
of constitutional adjudication. Some readers might object that in doing so I
have overshot the mark in two related respects. First, it could be objected
that by mapping the terrain in such a dichotomous way, I have left out a
large patch of habitable middle ground. A judge or scholar might embrace
some features of one of the two statements with which this Article began
but reject others, or even embrace some features of both. In particular, a
commitment to as-applied adjudication need not entail an understanding of
rights as shields for privileged conduct, and conversely, the enterprise of
facial adjudication need not entail the rejection of such an understanding.
To similar effect, the Marshallian injunction to "say what the law is" can be
satisfied to a large degree by case-specific, as-applied adjudication, and so
on.
Second, some might object that the as-applied versus facial distinction
is a much narrower and more technical phenomenon than I have suggested.
Indeed, courts and commentators often write as if the distinction turns on a
set of fairly modest factors rather than the broad competing visions of
adjudication that I emphasize. In some cases, for example, courts appear to
equate the question of whether constitutional adjudication is as-applied or

2. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 21-28 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)); infra text accompanying notes 68-78 (discussing Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007)).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 87-92 (discussing FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 127 S.
Ct. 2652 (2007)).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 93-128.
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facial with the timing of the litigation relative to the enforcement of the
challenged law: pre-enforcement actions are treated as facial challenges,
post-enforcement actions as as-applied challenges. 5 In other cases, courts
act as though the choice between as-applied and facial adjudication is
simply a matter of the plaintiffs litigating strategy: insofar as our civil
adjudication system is a plaintiff-driven one, the story goes, the plaintiff
should be the master of the mode in which her constitutional claims will be
adjudicated, just as she is the master of what causes of action to bring and
what evidence to rely on. 6 Moreover several prominent scholars have
argued that the as-applied versus facial distinction often boils down to
nothing grander than an inquiry into the severability of invalid statutory
provisions.7
As to the first objection, I freely concede that as-applied and facial
adjudications do not occupy distinct and mutually inaccessible conceptual
universes. Instead, what I mean to suggest is that when Supreme Court
justices confront the choice between these two modes of constitutional
analysis, they generally gravitate toward one or the other of the two
opposed visions of adjudication described at the beginning of this Article.
The features of each vision outlined in this Article are by no means strict
logical entailments, but are rather clusters of attributes that tend to
accompany each mode. So, for instance, I do not insist that the vision of

5. A good example here is A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305
F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002), in which Judge Frank Easterbrook rejected a facial challenge to an
Indiana statute that required women seeking abortions to make two trips to the clinic on the
grounds that enforcement of the statute had not yet begun and therefore it was unknown whether
it would impose an unconstitutional "undue burden" on women. Cf id. at 715-17 (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the undue burden test has a legislative purpose component which can be
examined on a pre-enforcement basis).
6. Hence the Court often speaks in terms of whether a facial challenge has been "brought,"
see, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193-94 (2008),
or can be "entertained," see, e.g., Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,
528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999), rather than whether facial adjudication is appropriate given the
substantive constitutional doctrine involved.
7. See Michael C. Dorf, FacialChallenges to State and FederalStatutes, 46 STAN. L. REV.
235, 251 (1994) (acknowledging the importance of substantive constitutional principles, but
arguing that when they do not come into play, "facial challenge doctrine really boils down to
severability doctrine combined with institutional limits on the Salerno presumption of
severability"); Gillian E. Metzger, FacialChallenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873,
876 (2005) ("[The debate regarding the availability of facial challenges, in particular facial
overbreadth challenges, is really a debate about statutory severability"); see also generally
Richard J. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and FacialChallenges and Third-PartyStanding, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1321 (2000) (arguing for "separability" as one of two primary factors, along with
"specification," that determine when it is appropriate for a court to depart from the normal
preference for as-applied adjudication).

Summer 2009]

FACIAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROBERTS COURT

693

rights as shields is uniquely compatible with as-applied adjudication. I do,
however, assert that a justice who adopts an understanding of particular
rights as shields is more likely to favor as-applied adjudication as the
vehicle for vindicating those rights in discrete cases than one who does
not.8 By the same token, a justice who rejects the paradigm of rights as
shields in certain contexts, perhaps in favor of a focus on the government's
reasons for acting, is likely to incline toward facial review in those
contexts. 9
Between these two objections, I am more inclined to take issue with
the second. There is in my view, for example, no necessary correlation
between the timing of a lawsuit and the mode in which it is adjudicatedindeed, we shall see examples from even the Roberts Court of postenforcement facial review 1° and pre-enforcement as-applied review.11 And,
as I have argued before, the as-applied versus facial distinction is not a
function of the plaintiffs litigation strategy or the doctrine of severability. 12
What matters most is the Court's understanding of substantive
constitutional doctrine and the way in which its understanding is reflected
in the breadth of the Court's holdings.
Both objections might have more force if my project were to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the precise boundary between as-applied and
facial challenges-but it is not. Rather, I am interested in explaining how
the Roberts Court has negotiated the choice between as-applied and facial
review in its cases, and what those cases tell us about how the justices view
the ongoing project of translating constitutional meaning into constitutional
doctrine.
Part I of this Article begins with a description of the traditional model
of judicial review, which strongly favors as-applied challenges over facial
ones, and then canvasses several recent cases in which the Court has
reaffirmed its adherence to that model. Part II discusses two categories of
cases that have been described as exceptions to the traditional modeloverbreadth cases and abortion rights cases-and demonstrates that the
Court has not been especially receptive of late to facial challenges even in
8. For a somewhat more extended discussion of this tendency, see David L. Franklin, Facial
Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IOWA L. REv. 41, 77, 81-82
(2006).
9. See id. at 80-81.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 21-28 (discussing Crawford v. Marion County
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 68-78 (discussing Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct.
1610 (2007)).
12.

Franklin, supra note 8, at 64-67.
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these areas. Part III exposes the intriguing phenomenon on the Roberts
Court that I label "facial adjudication in as-applied clothing" and reveals
that this phenomenon acts to mask the fact that facial review is not nearly
as rare as the traditional model would have us believe. The Article
concludes by suggesting some reasons why this phenomenon occurs,
focusing on substantive constitutional doctrines that necessitate an inquiry
into legislative purpose.
I. The Traditional Model
An apt starting point for our exploration of facial challenges and the
Roberts Court is the statement with which this Article began, which
embodies what I will call the traditional model of constitutional
adjudication. The traditional model finds its most uncompromising
expression, and its eternal case citation, in United States v. Salerno.13 In
rejecting a facial challenge to the pretrial detention provisions of the Bail
Reform Act, the Salerno Court stated that "[a] facial challenge is . . .the
most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid.' 14 Salerno purports to leave a narrow door open for facial
adjudication, but in an important sense it really does not: under the "no set
of circumstances" rule, even facial invalidation takes on an as-applied cast,
since, in theory, a court may resort to it only after it has been convinced
that each discrete application of the challenged statute is invalid. 15
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist laid out his "no set of
circumstances" test in Salerno quite matter-of-factly and with no citations
to precedent, the test has since become something of a battleground among
the justices. Justice Stevens has repeatedly insisted that Salerno does not
set out a general rule for adjudicating facial challenges,' 6 while Justice
Scalia has insisted with equal vigor that it does or at least should.17 On the
Roberts Court, the struggle over Salerno has subsided into an uneasy ceasefire for the time being, with the Court repeatedly citing the "no set of
circumstances" rule while at the same time acknowledging some

13. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
14. Id.
at 745.
15. Salerno does explicitly leave the door open for one type of facial challenge: First
Amendment challenges alleging that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. For a
discussion of overbreadth challenges, see infra text accompanying notes 41-44.
16. See, e.g., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174, 1175 (1996)
(mem.) (Justice Stevens concurring in denying certiorari).
17. See, e.g., id. at 1178 (Justice Scalia dissenting from denial of certiorari).

Summer 2009]

FACIAL CHALLENGES AND THE ROBERTS COURT

695

uncertainty about the domain over which it applies. 8 But regardless of the
fate of the Salerno test, the Court's recent discussions of the facial versus
as-applied controversy have made clear the Court's allegiance to the
traditional model. 19 Whenever the Court explicitly discusses the choice
between as-applied and facial challenges, it characterizes the former as the
norm and the latter as the exception. As the Court recently put it, quoting a
prominent scholar, "As-applied
challenges are the basic building blocks of
20
adjudication.,
constitutional
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board2' is an instructive
example of the Roberts Court's adherence to the traditional preference for
as-applied adjudication. In 2005, Indiana enacted a "voter ID" law,
requiring anyone who wants to cast a ballot in person to show poll workers
a piece of government-issued identification with his or her photo on it. As
soon as the voter ID law went into effect, the Indiana Democratic Party and
other plaintiffs challenged it on its face in court, raising constitutional
objections to the law's purposes and its effects. On the purposes side, the
plaintiffs argued that the Indiana legislature enacted the law to advance the
interests of the Republican Party22 rather than to meet any realistic threat of
in-person voter fraud. On the effects side, they argued that the law would
make it harder for people without photo IDs to vote-particularly elderly,
homeless, and/or poor people, all of whom are disproportionately likely to
vote Democratic (if they are allowed to vote). The plaintiffs likened the
logistical burdens imposed by the voter ID law to a state-imposed poll tax
of the kind the Court declared facially unconstitutional in a landmark 1966
ruling.23
The Court was not persuaded-the plaintiffs lost by a vote of 6-3.
Justice Stevens wrote the lead opinion for a three-justice plurality
consisting of himself, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. The
plurality concluded that the state's interests in combating both the reality
and the perception of in-person voter fraud were legitimate and important,
and that in any event the burden on voters of getting a photo ID was rather
small. One could quibble with the plurality's conclusion about legislative
18. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190
(2008); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007) ("we need not resolve that debate.").
19. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1190-91; Carhart, 127 S. Ct. at 1639; Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608-10 (2004).
20. Carhart,127 S. Ct. at 1639 (quoting Fallon, supra note 7, at 1328).
21. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008).

22.

All of the Republican state legislators voted in favor of the law, and all of the Democratic

legislators who were present voted against it. Id. at 1624 & n.21 (plurality opinion).
23. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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purpose, particularly in light of its own admission that "[t]he record
contains no evidence of any such fraud occurring in Indiana at any time in
its history,, 24 but that conclusion is not central to our project. What is
central is the plurality's statement that the plaintiffs needed to "bear a
heavy burden of persuasion" because they were bringing a facial
challenge.
In Justice Stevens's view, the plaintiffs were asking the Court to
balance the interests of the entire state in forestalling fraud against the
burdens experienced by a relative few.26 But the record contained no
reliable evidence of how many people were burdened, indeed no concrete
evidence of any burden at all. "A facial challenge," the plurality
concluded, "must fail where the statute has a plainly legitimate sweep. 2 7
Moreover, if the plaintiffs prevailed, the proper remedy (since the statute
was formally neutral and generally applicable) would be to invalidate the
statute as a whole-but such a remedy should be avoided unless absolutely
necessary, because it would frustrate the will of the people.2 8 Implicit in
Justice Stevens's emphasis on the facial nature of the Crawford litigation
was an invitation to future plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges,
presumably with better evidence in hand.
To the same effect as Crawford, and cited prominently in Justice
Stevens's discussion of facial challenges in that case, is Washington State
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party.29 In Washington State
Grange, the Court rejected a facial challenge to the state of Washington's
"blanket primary" system, in which candidates identify themselves on the
ballot by their own chosen party preference, and the top two vote-getters,
regardless of party preference, advance to the general election. The
challenge, wrote Justice Thomas for a five-justice majority, rested on
"factual assumptions about voter confusion that can be evaluated only in
the context of an as-applied challenge., 30 Facial challenges are generally
disfavored, the Court said, because they often rely on speculative factual
judgments; because they run counter to the principle of judicial restraint
24. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619 (plurality opinion). The only examples of in-person voter
fraud the plurality could cite were stories about Boss Tweed and the New York City elections of
1868, and an investigation of the 2004 Washington state gubernatorial race that revealed a single
fraudulent voter. Id. at 1619 nn.l 1-12.
25. Id. at 1621.
26. Id. at 1622.
27. Id. at 1623 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

28.
29.
30.

Id.
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (2008).
Id.at 1187.
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that cautions avoidance of broad or premature constitutional rulings; and
because they "short circuit the democratic process." 31 The upshot: unless
and until a plaintiff can prove that voters wrongly believe the two general
election candidates are in fact the nominees of the 3parties
they designate as
2
their favorites, the blanket primary must be upheld.
A final piece of evidence for the Court's adherence to the traditional
model is the 2004 case of Sabri v. United States.33 In Sabri, a convicted
briber contended that the federal bribery statute was facially
unconstitutional because it did not contain a "jurisdictional hook"-an
element of the offense that would ensure, in every prosecution, proof of a
constitutionally sufficient nexus between the bribe in question and some
federal spending program.34 The Court, in an opinion by Justice Souter,
unanimously rejected this contention, reasoning in view of the fungibility
of money that Congress's power under the Spending and Necessary and
Proper Clauses was more than adequate to cover bribes of at least five
thousand dollars in connection with programs receiving more than ten
thousand dollars in federal funds.3 5 Justice Souter's opinion concludes by
reprimanding Mr. Sabri for launching a facial attack against the statute:
[F]acial challenges are best when infrequent. Although passing on
the validity of a law wholesale may be efficient in the abstract, any
gain is often offset by losing the lessons taught by the particular, to
which common law method normally looks. Facial adjudication
carries too much promise of premature 36interpretation of statutes on
the basis of factually barebones records.
In sum, then, the Court in recent years has repeatedly reaffirmed its
fidelity to the traditional model with its strong preference for as-applied
challenges. It has done so, for the moment at any rate, without taking a
position on whether Salerno's "no set of circumstances" formulation
announces a broadly applicable rule for the availability of facial challenges.
While the Court is not ready to announce the virtual extinction of facial
adjudication, it is more than happy to proclaim its rarity.

31. Id.at1l9l.
32. Id. at 1193-94. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, argued in dissent that the only
plausible purpose behind the law was the legislature's desire to rein in non-centrist political
parties, which was in his view an illegitimate purpose. Id. at 1202 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33.
34.

Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
Id. at 604-05 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (2000)).

35.
36.

Id. at 605-06.
Id. at 608-09 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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It is worth pausing here to note the close kinship between the
traditional model and norms of judicial restraint and institutional modesty.
As-applied adjudication is the preferred approach, the Court tells us,
because the job of the judiciary is to decide concrete cases. The Court's
preference for as-applied adjudication, therefore, goes hand-in-hand with
its insistence on the jurisdictional requirement of standing, which also aims
to limit the judiciary to deciding actual disputes.37 The potent weapon of
constitutional invalidation is to be used sparingly; indeed, courts should
Facial
avoid constitutional issues altogether whenever possible. 38
challenges, which invite abstract, hypothetical, and premature
constitutional rulings, are an affront to these norms of modesty. Judicial
review should operate cautiously, narrowly, one case at a time. Or, as
Chief Justice Roberts once put it, "If it is not necessary to decide
more to
39
[dispose of a case], then. . . it is necessary not to decide more."

II. Special Cases: Overbreadth and (Maybe) Abortion Rights
Notwithstanding the dominance of the traditional model, the Court has
long recognized exceptions to it-special cases in which facial rather than
as-applied challenges are the norm. A recent article by David Gans
provides a thoughtful introduction to these special cases.
Gans
characterizes the Court's ventures into facial review as "strategic," and he
does not use that word pejoratively.4 ° On the contrary, Gans maintains that
in certain categories of cases the Court makes a judgment that facial
adjudication (more specifically, facial invalidation) is the best way of
implementing important constitutional norms. To take the most familiar
example, in many cases involving regulations on speech the Court has
made the judgment that reliance on case-by-case adjudication to sort out
valid from invalid applications would lead to a period of uncertainty during
which speakers might censor themselves rather than incur the expense of
defying or challenging the law. Better in such cases, from the standpoint of
First Amendment values, to invalidate the challenged regulation on its face,

37. Accordingly, exceptions to the as-applied model, principally the overbreadth doctrine, are
often described as exceptions to the ordinary rules of standing. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 7, at
1359.
38. See generally Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Ass'n, 297 U.S. 288, 341-48 (1935) (Brandeis,

J., concurring).
39. ChiefJustice Says His Goal is More Consensus on Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006,
A 16 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/22/washington/22justice.html?fta=y.
40.

David H. Gans, Strategic FacialChallenges, 85 B. U. L. REv. 1333 (2005).
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even at the cost of leaving some proscribable speech untouched, than to
keep it on the books and chill speech.4 '
The result is the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, which even
Salerno recognized as an exception to the traditional preference for asapplied adjudication.42
Gans argues that facial invalidation is
"strategically" appropriate not only for statutes that create a chilling effect
with respect to speech and other fundamental rights, but also for statutes
that confer excessive discretion on government officials and those that send
a message of stigma or inferiority.43 For Gans, then, "strategic" means
something like "more beneficial than harmful in translating constitutional
meaning into constitutional doctrine." 44
That, at any rate, is the theory behind overbreadth doctrine. In
practice, the Roberts Court's latest foray into the world of overbreadth was
not friendly to facial challenges. In the 2008 case of United States v.
Williams,45 the Court rejected a defendant's facial challenge to a provision
of the ridiculously named Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act, or "PROTECT Act.",46 The statute
made it a federal crime to knowingly pander or solicit material through the
interstate communications system in a way that is designed to make the
recipient believe he is getting child pornography or that reflects such a
belief, even if the belief is untrue, i.e., even if the materials are not child
pornography. The Court, in a 7-2 decision written by Justice Scalia, held
that the statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad because it did not
prohibit a sufficiently large amount of protected expressive activity.47
Along the way, Justice Scalia archly commented that the objections of the
defendant and his amici "demonstrate nothing so forcefully as the tendency
of our overbreadth doctrine to summon forth an endless stream of fanciful
hypotheticals. ' 4 Justice Souter, joined in dissent by Justice Ginsburg,

41.
42.

See, e.g., id. at 1137-38 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,611-15 (1973)).
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).

43. Gans, supra note 40, at 1338. According to Gans, these statutes include ones that are
impermissibly vague, that grant government decisionmakers too much discretion to advance
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, and that criminalize private sexual activity. Id.
at 1364-87.
44. See, e.g., id. at 1337.
45. United States v. Williams, 128 S.Ct. 1830 (2008).

46.

18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2006).

47. Williams, 128 S.Ct. at 1841-45.
48. Id. at 1843.
The Court also rejected the claim that the statute was facially
unconstitutional because of vagueness. Id. at 1845-47.
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would have found the statute overbroad because in some cases it makes it
unlawful for a person to offer to sell lawful material.49
Nonetheless, First Amendment overbreadth remains a well-settled
(indeed, paradigmatic) exception to the preference for as-applied
adjudication. Far less settled is whether cases involving abortion rights
constitute a similar exception. The Court as recently as 2004 suggested
that they do, 50 but more recent cases tell a different story.
To tell the full story of abortion rights and facial challenges, we need
to take a brief trip back to the 1992 case that gave rise to modem abortion
rights jurisprudence: Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey.51 Before that facial challenge to a Pennsylvania abortion law
reached the Supreme Court, it reached a panel of the Third Circuit. As luck
and irony would have it, one of the judges on that panel was Samuel Alito,
who found himself in the position of trying to predict the reactions of the
justice he would eventually succeed on the Supreme Court, Sandra Day
O'Connor. Writing in partial dissent in Casey, Judge Alito made two
predictions, one of which was right: he correctly guessed (as did the panel
majority) that Justice O'Connor, reinforced by colleagues appointed by
Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, would tug a controlling bloc of
justices away from the rigid confines of Roe v. Wade52 and toward the
looser "undue burden" framework that she had been outlining in her own
separate opinions for the better part of a decade. 53 Judge Alito's other
prediction was wrong: he thought the Court would uphold Pennsylvania's
spousal notification requirement on the grounds that it did not impose an
undue burden. After all, the record suggested that 95 percent of married
women voluntarily tell their husbands before getting an abortion, and most
of the remaining 5 percent wouldn't mind being required to do so, or would

49.

Id. at 1848-58 (Souter, J., dissenting).

50. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 610 (2004) (citing the abortion rights case of
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000), as an example in which the Court "recognized the
validity of facial attacks alleging overbreadth (though not necessarily using that term)" outside
the First Amendment context).
51.
52.

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Roev. Wade, 410U.S. 113(1973).

53. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 687-98 (3rd Cir. 1991), rev'd
in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (adopting "undue burden" standard); id. at 689-90 (tracing that
standard to Justice O'Connor's dissenting and concurring opinions in such cases as Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)); id. at 720 (Alito, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that "undue burden" standard is appropriate

standard of review).
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qualify for an exception under the statute.54 Judge Alito read Justice
O'Connor's opinions to mean that "an undue burden may not be
established simply by showing that a law will have a heavy impact on a
few women,, 55 and that in a facial challenge to a statutory provision, "proof
women
that the provision would adversely affect an unknown number of
56
with a particular combination of characteristics could not suffice.,
When the case made it to the Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor,
writing her section of the controlling joint opinion,5 7 shot down Judge
Alito's analysis unceremoniously:
The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured
for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose
conduct it affects.... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is
the group for whom 58the law is a restriction, not the group for whom
the law is irrelevant.
Justice O'Connor cited a First Amendment case by way of analogynewspapers cannot be forced to adopt a "right of reply" policy for their
editorial pages even if most would do so voluntarily 59-and went on to
suggest that the real infirmity of the spousal notification provision was that
it embodied an outmoded and repellent view of marriage in which the
husband enjoyed dominion over his wife. 60 The Court held the provision
invalid on its face.
Fast-forward fourteen years to January 2006 and the last opinion
Justice O'Connor would write for the Court before being replaced by
Samuel Alito. Justice O'Connor described the issue presented by Ayotte v.
PlannedParenthoodof Northern New England61 as solely one of remedy:
if a statute requiring a parent or guardian to be notified before a minor gets
an abortion is deemed unconstitutional because it lacks an exception for
54.

Id. at 722-23.

55.
56.

Id.at721.
Id. at 722 n.1.

57. The various sections of the joint opinion in Casey were not separately attributed, but
researchers using the papers of Justice Blackmun have since confirmed what everybody suspected
at the time-that Justice O'Connor wrote the section striking down the spousal notification
provision. See, e.g., JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME

COURT 58-59 (2007).
58. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992).
59. Id. (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)).

60.
61.

Id. at 896-98.
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
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cases of medical emergency, should the statute be struck down on its face
or should narrower relief be ordered? On this remedial question, the Court
was unanimous: "Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional
flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem."62 Partial
rather than facial invalidation is the usual remedy for unconstitutionality, so
long as the partial remedy is within judicial competence and does not
circumvent the intent of the legislature.63 The Court's decision in Stenberg
6 4 facially invalidating
v. Carhart
Nebraska's ban on "partial-birth abortion"
was not to the contrary because "the parties in Stenberg did not ask for, and
we did not contemplate, relief more finely drawn., 65 In short, since "only a
few applications" of the parental notification statute were unconstitutional,
the lower courts should craft an injunction barring enforcement of the
statute in those few instances.6 6
The Court's approach to the facial challenge issue certainly seems to
have shifted between Casey and Ayotte, but as a technical matter we can
reconcile the two cases without too much fancy footwork. The spousal
notification provision in the former case was unconstitutional on its face
and had to be struck entirely. The parental notification provision in the
latter case was, we could say, unconstitutional on its face for want of a
health exception, but this time the Court concluded that the infirmity could
be cured by judicial surgery. So even in Ayotte the facial challenge was in
some sense successful: the plaintiffs' sought-after remedy was narrowed
but not denied.6 7
Explaining the Court's change of tack in the 2007 case of Gonzales v.
Carhart6 8 is an entirely different matter. In that case, the Court upheld the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 against facial, preenforcement attack. Put aside for the moment the implausibility of Justice
Kennedy's attempts to distinguish Stenberg, in which the Court invalidated
a very similar Nebraska statute--chalk it up to crisper legislative
draftsmanship and a healthy dollop of deference to Congress. 69 What is
again most interesting for us is the Court's treatment of the facial challenge
62.

Id. at 328.

63.
64.
65.

Id. at 329-30.
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.

66. Id.
67. This at any rate seems to be how Justice Ginsburg later interpreted the outcome in Ayotte.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1651-52 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610 (2007).
69. As opposed, say, to a change in personnel on the Court from Justice O'Connor to Justice
Alito.
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issue. Justice Kennedy begins by acknowledging the tension between the
Salerno "no set of circumstances" test and the analysis of the spousal
notification provision in Casey, which focused on those women for whom
it presented an obstacle. 70 But, he says, it is unnecessary to resolve that
tension here, because even the Casey test requires the plaintiffs to show
"that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant
cases," 71 and these plaintiffs haven't done that. What of the federal
statute's lack of a health exception, which was a fatal (and facial) defect in
Stenberg, and even seemingly in Ayotte? Justice Kennedy's response is
terse:
We note that the statute here applies to all instances in which the
doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure, not merely those in
which the woman suffers from medical complications. It is neither
our obligation nor within our traditional institutional role to resolve
with respect to potential situations that
questions of constitutionality
72
might develop.
After all, "[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of
constitutional adjudication, '73 and the Act remains open to as-applied
challenges, even on a pre-enforcement basis, in future cases.
This really is impossible to square with Casey and Ayotte, not to
mention Stenberg. Under the logic of those earlier cases, as Justice
Ginsburg points out in her dissent, if it is the absence of an exception that
triggers the undue burden analysis, then the undueness of the burden must
be assessed with regard to those women for whom the exception would
have been relevant. Justice Kennedy reads Casey as mandating a "large
fraction" test, but "there is no fraction when the numerator and the
denominator are the same: The health exception reaches only those cases
where a woman's health is at risk.",7 4 And even if the Court believed
striking down the Act was too extravagant a remedy, why not order the
lower courts to enjoin its enforcement where medically necessary, as the
Court unanimously suggested in Ayotte? 75 Perhaps most puzzling of all,
what exactly did the Court have in mind when it invited a new round of
70. Stenberg, 127 S.Ct. at 1639 (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502,
514 (1990); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992)).
71. Id. (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Fallon, supra note 7, at 1328).
74. Id. at 1651 n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
75.

See id. at 1651.
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"preenforcement, as-applied
As Justice Ginsburg notes, preenforcement facial challenges had already yielded hundreds of pages of
77
testimony and detailed factual findings from several district courts.
Waiting for plaintiffs to prove that "in discrete and well-defined instances a
particular condition has [occurred] or is likely to occur in which the
procedure prohibited by the Act must be used" 78 would mean, at best,
incurring a serious medical cost for an uncertain evidentiary benefit.
On the basis of Gonzales v. Carhart,it is hard to resist the conclusion
that the Court has abandoned Justice O'Connor's facial approach from
Casey and has assimilated abortion rights cases to the traditional model in
which as-applied challenges hold sway.
challenges"?7 6

Il. Facial Adjudication in As-Applied Clothing
When we turn from abortion rights to another contentious
constitutional issue--campaign finance reform-it looks at first as though a
very similar pattern is repeating itself: the Court rebuffs facial overbreadthtype claims in favor of case-by-case elaboration through as-applied
challenges. But, as we shall see, the story does not end the same way.
Instead, the campaign finance cases give us an insight into a different trend,
one that has accelerated at the Court in recent years-what I call facial
adjudication in as-applied clothing.
The campaign finance story has three acts, corresponding to the cases
in the Court's recent triple-header concerning "electioneering
communications." The statute at issue in all three cases is section 203 of
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 ("BCRA"), commonly
known as McCain-Feingold.7 9 Section 203 prohibits corporations and labor
unions from using their general treasury funds to pay for electioneering
communications, defined as any communication that refers to a candidate
for federal office and is aired within
thirty days of a primary election or
80
sixty days of a general election.
In the first act, the 2003 McConnell case, 8' the Court confronted a
facial challenge alleging that the electioneering provision was
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment because it swept
within its reach not only campaign ads ("Vote against Senator Warbucks")
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1638 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1638 (majority opinion).

79.
80.

2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2000).
Id. § 434(f)(3)(A).

81.

McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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but also issue ads that just happen to mention a candidate's name ("Call
Senator Warbucks and tell him how you feel about the Wall Street
bailout"). Justices Stevens and O'Connor, writing for a five-justice
majority, were not impressed by the distinction between the two types of
ads. Indeed, they held that the First Amendment does not "erect[] a rigid
barrier between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy," and
forthrightly admitted that the Court's landmark Buckley decision had drawn
a "functionally meaningless" line by interpreting existing law to prohibit
only the former and not the latter.8 2 Given that the barrier between express
advocacy and issue advocacy was too permeable to have any special First
Amendment significance-and especially given that corporations were free
to pay for electioneering with segregated political action committee
("PAC") funds-the
Court held that the overbreadth challenge to section
83
203 had to fail.
Next, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. ("WRTL"), a corporation that
wanted to run issue ads naming federal candidates during the 2004 election,
brought an as-applied challenge to section 203. A three-judge district court
dismissed the case, relying on a footnote in McConnell in which the Court
had said it was "uphold[ing] all applications of the primary definition" of
electioneering communications. 84
The Supreme Court vacated and
reversed in a brief per curiam opinion issued a few days before Justice
O'Connor's retirement.8 5
The lower court had misunderstood the
McConnell footnote, which had simply meant to say that the statutory
definition was facially valid with respect to BCRA's funding and
disclosure requirements, not that all as-applied challenges to section 203
were precluded.86 One can sympathize with the district court for making
this "error"-if the line between campaign ads and issue ads is
"functionally meaningless," as McConnell had held, then what First
Amendment interest could be served by vindicating an as-applied challenge
to a provision that regulates both?
When the WRTL litigation made it back to the Court for the third act
in FederalElection Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life ("WRTL 11"'),87

82.

Id. at 193-94 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam).

83. Id. at 190-94. The Court also upheld the provision of BCRA requiring extensive
disclosures by those who fund electioneering communications. Id. at 194-202.
84. Wis. Right to Life v. FEC, 126 S. Ct. 1016, 1017-18 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 n.73).
85.

Id.

86.

Id.

87.

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL I1), 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
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the Roberts Court was fully assembled, and its tune had changed. Not only
did WRTL's as-applied challenge succeed, but the Court strongly
suggested that from now on all challenges brought by organizations
engaged in issue advocacy would succeed. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, who had already voted in McConnell to strike down section 203
on its face, stuck to their position. 88 Meanwhile, the Court's newest
member, Justice Alito, joined Chief Justice Roberts's lead opinion, which
concluded in light of First Amendment concerns that "a court should find
that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy [and therefore
covered by section 203] only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific
candidate.,, 89 No competently counseled organization would run a political
ad that satisfied this test, as Chief Justice Roberts no doubt understood, so
any enforcement of section 203 in a particular case would run up against an
impassable constitutional roadblock. Thus WRTL II amounts in effect to a
facial invalidation of section 203 in as-applied clothing.
In WRTL II, Justice Scalia (joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas)
wrote separately to express his view that section 203 should have been
struck down on its face "to avoid the chilling of fundamental political
discourse. 90 As-applied challenges, in his view, were an inadequate
response to the overbreadth of the electioneering provision. 91 Indeed,
Justice Scalia went so far as to accuse his colleagues in the majorityChief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito---of disingenuousness, noting that
"seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent views concerning the
constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree that the [WRTL fl]
opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so," and' 92tartly
concluding that "[t]his faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.

88.

See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 273-75 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)

(arguing for the facial invalidation of § 203); id. at 323-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (same); WRTL 11, 127 S. Ct. at 2683-87 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that McConnell should be overruled and section 203
declared facially unconstitutional).
89. WRTL II, 127 S. Ct. at 2667 (majority opinion).

90.
91.
92.

Id. at 2680 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id.at2684.
Id. at 2683 n.7. Justice Scalia's accusation may have hit home, for the Court was not so

oblique about its use of facial analysis in a more recent campaign finance case. In Davis v. FEC,
128 S.Ct. 2759 (2008), the Court forthrightly vindicated a facial challenge to BCRA's so-called

"Millionaire's Amendment," 2 U.S.C. § 441a-l(a), which increased the otherwise applicable
contribution limits for any federal candidate as soon as his or her opponent spent more than
$350,000 in personal money on the campaign. The Court held that the statute in effect penalized
wealthy candidates for exercising their First Amendment right to make unlimited personal
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Justice Scalia was right. WRTL II renders McConnell a practical
nullity by laying out a test under which every realistically conceivable asapplied challenge to section 203 will succeed, while at the same time
purporting not to disturb the holding of McConnell, which upheld that
provision against facial attack. The Court's reliance on the as-applied
mode here can aptly be labeled "strategic," but only if we use the label in a
less wholesome sense than David Gans intended. The Court in WRTL II
borrowed the language of the traditional, as-applied model-the rhetoric of
judicial modesty-in an attempt to soften what was both a facial
invalidation and a significant overruling. Pretending to take small steps,
the Court made a giant leap.
Facial adjudication in as-applied clothing need not always result in
93
invalidation. Sometimes it does quite the opposite, as Gonzales v. Raich
shows. The plaintiffs in Raich were seriously ill Californians who used
94
locally grown marijuana for medical purposes as authorized by state law.
Unfortunately for them, their conduct was criminal under the federal
Controlled Substances Act ("CSA"), which classifies marijuana as a
Schedule I drug, meaning that as far as Congress is concerned the drug has
no currently accepted medical use.95 The plaintiffs argued successfully in
the Ninth Circuit that the CSA was unconstitutional as applied to them
because it exceeded Congress's regulatory authority under the Interstate
Commerce Clause. In a 6-3 ruling written by Justice Stevens, the Court
disagreed.
What is so striking about Raich is that the Court acknowledged that it
was dealing with an as-applied challenge-a departure from recent
Commerce Clause cases, which had involved facial challenges-but treated
96
this fact as a reason to be less receptive than usual to the plaintiffs' claim.
expenditures on campaign speech, and was therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Davis, 128 S.Ct.
at 2772. The statute could not withstand that kind of scrutiny because the interests it pursuedleveling the electoral playing field for non-wealthy candidates and alleviating the restrictive
effects of existing regulations-were not only not compelling but "antithetical to the First
Amendment." Id. at 2773, 2774.
93. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Although Raich was decided in the waning years
of the Rehnquist Court, there is no reason to believe the Roberts Court will take a fundamentally
different approach to the Commerce Clause. After all, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor dissented in Raich, so their replacement by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito
would not change the outcome in that case. In any event, the Roberts Court has evinced no
interest thus far in revisiting the issues that were raised in Raich. For my own earlier thoughts
about Raich and the concept of facial validation, see David L. Franklin, supra note 8, at 51-52.
94.
95.

Raich, 545 U.S. at 6-7.
Id. at 14.

96. Id. at 23 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000)). Raich goes on to conclude that "[tihis distinction [between facial and as-
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Justice Stevens reasoned that narrow, single-subject federal statutes, like
those criminalizing the possession of guns near schools or providing civil
remedies for rape victims, might fall wholly outside Congress's commerceregulating power and are therefore vulnerable to facial attack. 97 But when
a statute establishes a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of a
commodity for which there is an interstate market, then Congress may
extend its regulatory authority to cover any subclass of activities that it
rationally concludes is "an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme,"98
even if those activities are themselves local and noncommercial in nature.
Justice Scalia, in concurrence, arrived at the same conclusion by relying on
the Necessary and Proper Clause, "which empowers Congress to enact laws
in effectuation of its enumerated powers that are not within its authority to
enact in isolation." 99 Raich, in short, facially validated the CSA for
Commerce Clause purposes.' 0 0 And given that the plaintiffs' activities in
Raich were about as local and noncommercial as one can get and yet they
still lost, it is not too far a stretch to conclude that the Court has in effect
outlawed as-applied constitutional challenges under the Commerce
Clause.' 0
In this light, it is interesting to glance back at the brief concurrence
filed by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, in Sabri v. United
States.'O2 Recall that Sabri was the 2004 case in which the Court
unanimously upheld a federal bribery statute against a facial challenge
alleging that Congress had exceeded its powers under the Spending Clause.
In Justice Kennedy's four-sentence-long concurrence in Sabri, he pointedly
declines to join the section of the majority opinion throwing cold water on
facial challenges and emphasizes that the majority does not call into
question the Court's approach in United States v. Lopez and United States
v. Morrison: "In those instances the Court did resolve the basic question
applied challenges] is pivotal for we have often reiterated that where the class of activities is
regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise,
as trivial, individual instances of the class." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Raich, 545 U.S. at 23-26 (describing the Lopez and Morrison precedents).
98. Id.at 27.
99. Id. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421-22 (1819)).
100. For more on facial validation, see Franklin, supra note 8, at 64-65.
101. Lower courts have drawn the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Nascimento,
491 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Stewart, 451 F.3d 1071, 1076-77 (9th Cir.
2006). It is of course still open for parties to argue as a matter of statutory interpretation that a
particular federal statute ought to be construed narrowly not to apply to their conduct in the first
place in light of federalism concerns. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
102. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
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whether Congress, in enacting the statutes challenged there, had exceeded
its legislative power under the Constitution." 10 3 Thus Justices Kennedy and
Scalia left themselves room, in cases involving the scope of congressional
authority, to engage not only in facial invalidation, as in Lopez and
Morrison, but also in facial validation. For Justices Kennedy and Scalia,
when "basic questions" concerning "legislative power" are at issue, the
traditional preference for as-applied challenges ought to give way. It is
probably no coincidence that they proved to be the only two justices from
the Court's conservative wing to side with the majority in Raich in facially
validating the CSA.
Once we learn to recognize it, facial validation crops up in some4
surprising contexts. Take the recent case of Altria Group, Inc. v. Good.'0
The question in Altria was whether smokers could maintain a state-law
fraud action against a tobacco company for falsely claiming that its "light"
cigarettes delivered less tar and nicotine than regular cigarettes. The
cigarette maker's defense was that the lawsuit was preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("Labeling Act"), which
says that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or
promotion of any cigarettes" covered by the federal statute.10 5 Here the
challenge to the state law was not one of unconstitutionality per se, but of
preemption. One could try to dissolve the distinction by pointing out that
enforcement of a preempted state law is unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause, 0 6 but for our purposes there is no need: what matters is
that a law is invalid and unenforceable insofar as it is preempted, just as it
is invalid and unenforceable insofar as it is unconstitutional. The fact that
the superior law to which the state law must yield comes from Congress
rather than from the Constitution should not have any effect on the
dynamic of the facial versus as-applied debate.'0 7
In Altria, the Court held that the state anti-fraud law was not
preempted. Picking up where he had left off in a plurality opinion sixteen

103. Id. at 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)).
104. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008).

105.

15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006).

106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
107. The difference, of course, is that Congress could overturn the Court's ruling in a
preemption case but not in a constitutional case. This difference ought to mean that the Court's
preemption decisions have greater stare decisis effect than its constitutional decisions, but that
factor was not important in Altria, where the key precedent was a non-binding plurality opinion,
as described in the text.
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years earlier,1 °8 Justice Stevens (writing this time for a five-justice
majority) held that "the phrase 'based on smoking and health' [in the
Labeling Act] modifies the state-law rule at issue rather than a particular
application of that rule." 10 9 Because the state anti-fraud statute at issue in
Altria codified a general duty not to deceive, and did not on its face have
anything to do with smoking or health, it was not preempted." 0 The fact
that the smokers in this particular litigation were alleging that the defendant
made false statements about smoking and health was immaterial. After all,
the Labeling Act "preempts only requirements and prohibitions-i.e.,
rules-that are based on smoking and health.""'
Altria is a facial
validation of state anti-fraud laws as against Labeling Act preemption, just
as Raich is a facial validation of the CSA as against Commerce Clause
attack. 12
The Court will soon have another opportunity to engage in facial
validation-or invalidation if it so chooses-in a case that echoes Raich but
tests the limits of a different source of federal legislative power. The
statutory provision at issue in the pending case of Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder ("NAMUDNO")"1 3 is
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). That provision
prohibits political jurisdictions in covered states, mostly southern, from
changing their voting regulations without first getting "preclearance" from
the Department of Justice or a special three-judge court. 1 4 In 2006,
Congress reauthorized section 5 for an additional twenty-five years by an
overwhelming bipartisan vote.11 5 Days later, a wastewater treatment
district on the outskirts of Austin, Texas, filed an action challenging the
provision's constitutionality.

108. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
109. Altria, 129 S. Ct. at 545 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v.
Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001)).

110. Id.
111.
112.

Id. at 547.
Justice Thomas, dissenting in Altria, took an as-applied approach, interpreting the

Labeling Act as preempting any claim that, if successful at trial, would require tobacco
companies to take corrective action based on the effects of smoking upon health. Id. at 554
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 554, 555 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
113. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, No. 08-322, 2008 WL 4153806 (S.
Ct. Jan. 9,2009) (noting probable jurisdiction).
114. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973c (2008).
115. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 228-29
(D.D.C. 2008).
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In its initial complaint, the plaintiff in NAMUDNO launched both
facial and as-applied challenges, but in its amended complaint it tried to
repackage its action as exclusively as-applied. 16 Here is where the parallel
with Raich becomes apparent. Even if section 5 is generally valid, the
argument goes, it cannot constitutionally be applied to a small wastewater
treatment district that was not even established until more than twenty
years after the VRA's initial enactment; that has never been denied
preclearance or even been subjected to federal scrutiny; and whose
proposed voting modifications may be as trivial as "a' 7plan to move a
polling place across the street from a church to a school." "
The three-judge district court prudently ignored the labels in the
complaint and focused instead on the substance of the arguments offered in
the briefs and the nature of the Supreme Court's precedents in this area. As
a result, it treated the challenge as a facial one." 8 The Court held that
section 5 was facially valid under both the lenient rationality test set forth
in the Court's cases upholding the constitutionality of the VRA and the
more exacting "congruence and proportionality" test announced in more
recent cases testing Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power. 19 Its opinion left no more room for as-applied challenges than did
the Supreme Court's decision in Raich: "[W]here, as here, Congress has
compiled a sufficient legislative record to defeat a facial constitutional
challenge, . . . an as-applied challenge based on a political subunit's record
of nondiscrimination must also fail." '' 2 in fact, the district courti went so
far as to imply that all challenges testing the scope of Congress's
enumerated authority must be resolved facially. 121
22
This last suggestion goes a bit too far, as I have argued before.'
Indeed, toward the end of the Rehnquist Court, the justices sparred over
just this issue in a case testing the limits of Congress's enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment-and the contingent that
favored mandatory facial review lost. Writing for a five-justice majority in

116. /d.at235.
117. Id. at 281 (quoting First Amended Complaint at 3, Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221 (No.
1:06-CV-01384)).
118.

Id.

119. Id. at 247-68 (applying the rationality test of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966)); id. at 268-79 (applying the "congruence and proportionality" test of City of Boeme v.

Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).
120.

Id. at 280.

121. Id. at 281 (stating that the plaintiff's as-applied theory "finds no support in cases
addressing claims that Congress exceeded its enumerated powers").
122.

See Franklin,supra note 8, at 82-83.
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Tennessee v. Lane,'23 Justice Stevens held that Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was a valid exercise of federal authority
insofar as it enforced the constitutional right of access to the courts. 124 In
dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed "grave doubts about importing
an 'as applied' approach into the Section 5 context."' 125 Still, even Lane
does not adopt a purely as-applied perspective toward the question of
congressional power; it is better understood as resting on the plausible idea
that legislation crafted to enforce constitutional rights can be evaluated
with respect to subclasses of cases involving those rights. 126 This idea is of
no use to the plaintiff in NAMUDNO because section 5 of the VRA is
designed to protect, in all of its applications, the same double-barreled
constitutional right: the right to be free of racial discrimination with respect
to the fundamental interest in voting.1 27 Thus, the Supreme Court in
NAMUDNO is faced with what seems an inescapably facial constitutional
question. 128 In view of the watershed status of the Voting Rights Act in
American law and society-a status that some may view as confirmed by
the election of the nation's first African-American president-the stage
may be set for yet another facial validation.
The notion of facial validation brings us back to the case with which
we started, Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.129 Recall that in
Crawford,the facial challenge to Indiana's voter ID law failed because the
plaintiffs had assembled an inadequate factual record, but Justice Stevens's
lead opinion suggested that future as-applied challenges, with better
evidence, might succeed.130 Law school professors used to hypothesize a
maximally credible witness list by asking their students to imagine a
"busload of nuns." In the case of the Indiana voter ID law, we don't need
to imagine it: during the primary election in May 2008, about a dozen nuns
from a retirement home at Saint Mary's Convent near the University of
123. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
124. Id. at 530 & n.18; see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006) (holding that
Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity insofar as it prohibits conduct that
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
125. Lane, 541 U.S. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
126. See Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the FederalistRevival
After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUp. CT. REV. 1, 27.
127. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 269 (D.D.C.

2008).
128. Of course, the Court could escape the constitutional question entirely, for instance by
holding that the plaintiff is entitled to an exemption from preclearance by way of the statutory
"bailout" provision, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1973b(a)(l) (2008).
129. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S.Ct. 1610 (2008).
130. Id. at 1623 (plurality opinion).
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Notre3 Dame were turned away from the polls because they lacked photo
IDs.1

1

Suppose the nuns were to bring an as-applied challenge; is there any
reason to be confident they would succeed? The balancing test announced
in Crawford would presumably continue to apply, as would the Court's
finding that the state's purpose of avoiding fraud was legitimate and
important. True, the plurality in Crawford was willing to assume that "the
burden [of getting a photo ID or casting a provisional ballot] may not be
justified as to a few voters,"' 132 but this is one of those assumptions that
seems to have been indulged almost solely for the sake of argument. After
all, the plurality also notes that for most voters, "the inconvenience of
making a trip to the [Bureau of Motor Vehicles], gathering the required
documents, and posing for a photograph surely does not qualify as a
substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a significant
increase over the usual burdens of voting."' 33 Given Justice Stevens's
skepticism on the subject of burdens, not to mention the broad (if grudging)
societal acceptance of photo IDs as a requirement of entry everywhere from
airports to office buildings, the smart money is not on the nuns.
But there is a more fundamental reason why it is difficult to envision a
successful as-applied challenge being mounted in the wake of Crawford's
failed facial challenge. The alleged constitutional infirmity of the voter ID
law was that it violated the Equal Protection Clause, and equal protection
jurisprudence in recent decades has not been friendiy to as-appiied
challenges. As Justice Scalia reminds us in his concurrence in Crawford, a
facially neutral law will not be held to deny equal protection simply
because it burdens some people more than others, even if the burdened
group is a suspect class. 134 And when a law is held to deny equal
protection, the typical result is not an exemption carved out by the Court
for the benefit of the plaintiff and others similarly situated; it is facial
invalidation. 135 Because modem equal protection doctrine focuses on
131. Scott Martelle, Nuns are turned away from Indianapolls under voter ID law, L.A. TIMEs,
May 7, 2008, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2008/may/07/nation/na-voterid7.
132. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 (plurality opinion).
133. Id. (plurality opinion); see also id. at 1621 n.19 (plurality opinion) (suggesting that the
only voters facing a significant burden are those with religious scruples about being
photographed).
134. Id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248

(1976)).
135. See Dorf, supra note 7, at 260. I say facial invalidation is the typical rather than the
inevitable result because it is still theoretically possible for a facially neutral law to violate the
Equal Protection Clause by virtue of drastically unequal administration. In such cases, the
remedy might be an injunction against continued unequal implementation rather than invalidation
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attributes at the level of the statute itself-most notably formal
classifications and invidious legislative intent-rather than on effects at the
level of individual applications, modem equal protection adjudication is
typically an all-or-nothing affair. Laws that are based on suspect
classifications or impermissible purposes, like the student assignment
policies in the Seattle and Louisville school district cases, 136 are struck
down in their entirety, while laws that are formally neutral and supported
by adequate governmental objectives, like the voter ID law in Crawford,
are for all practical purposes facially validated. Likewise, the requirement
of narrow tailoring, which is in essence an unusually exacting prohibition
on overbreadth, lends itself to facial review.' 37
Equal protection
adjudication is, at least presumptively, facial adjudication,
regardless of
138
whether it comes dressed in as-applied clothing.

Conclusion
Our tour of the Roberts Court's constitutional decisions, necessarily
incomplete though it has been, yields three important lessons. First, the
traditional model of judicial review, which asserts that as-applied
adjudication is the norm and facial adjudication a rare and suspicious
exception, is alive and well on the Court. Indeed, the Court in recent years
of the law itself. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But see United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (setting high hurdle for selective prosecution claims under the
Equal Protection Clause).
136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
137. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 416-21 (1998) (noting affinities between narrow tailoring
and overbreadth). The requirement of congruence and proportionality in the exercise of
Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is also essentially a prohibition on
overbreadth.
138. This is not a new feature of equal protection jurisprudence. In the landmark 1966 case
relied upon by the Crawford plaintiffs, for example, the Court pronounced the poll tax
unconstitutional on its face, not merely as applied to those voters who were unable to pay. See
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966) ("We conclude that a State
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard....
We say the same whether
the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in his pocket or nothing at all, pays the fee or
fails to pay it."). To be sure, some older cases do appear to stand for the proposition that facially
neutral laws can deny equal protection insofar as they have the effect of depriving some people of
a fundamental right. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that a state must
waive fees for trial transcripts in cases involving indigent defendants if a free transcript is
necessary for adequate and effective appellate review). But however one wishes to explain cases
like Griffin, they do not represent the prevailing trend on the Court today, even with respect to
textually enumerated fundamental rights. Cf. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not mandate exemptions
for religious practitioners from neutral rules of general applicability).
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has made a point of reaffirming its preference for as-applied review in case
after case. Claims involving abortion rights, which appeared to constitute a
prominent counter example, have been assimilated to the traditional model,
first with respect to remedies in Ayotte and then with respect to underlying
rights in Gonzales v. Carhart. Even the doctrine of overbreadth, the
longest-standing and best-established exception to the traditional model,
has not fared well on the Court in recent years.
Second, the Court has been alert to what we might call the strategic
uses of the traditional model and its accompanying rhetoric.
By
emphasizing the norms of judicial modesty that lie at the heart of the
traditional model, the Court can try to soften the blow of an effective
overruling, as in Carhart,or to disguise a facial invalidation, as in WRTL
IL Even Justice Stevens in Crawfordmay have seen some strategic benefit
in accentuating the impression that the Court was merely rejecting a facial
challenge, leaving a door theoretically open for future plaintiffs even if
none is ever able to walk through it. The Roberts Court's strategic
deployment of the traditional model has given us a distinctive cxeation:
facial adjudication in as-applied clothing.
Third, and most important, we have seen that despite the Court's
repeated declarations of allegiance to the traditional model, facial
adjudication is not at all rare. That is because the distinction between asapplied and facial review, far from being a by-product of severability
doctrine or the particulars of the plaintiffs plea for relief, is most centrally
a function of substantive constitutional doctrine. When the applicable
doctrinal tests point the Court toward attributes that operate at the level of
the statute-most notably legislative purpose-the resulting adjudication
will likely be facial in nature. 139 Thus, as we have seen, substantive
constitutional doctrine presses equal protection cases toward facial review,
but the same can be said of cases in areas as diverse as the Commerce
Clause,14 ° the Establishment Clause, 14 1 and the separation of powers. 42 If,
139. It is possible in theory for a court to investigate the purpose of a challenged statute not
only on its face but also as applied. Indeed, something of this sort appears to go on in First
Amendment cases such as Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 71 (1971). See, e.g., Eugene Volokh,
Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, "Situation-Altering
Utterances, " and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 1277, 1286-1311 (arguing that the
Court in Cohen and other First Amendment cases has inquired whether a generally applicable,
facially neutral law was enforced against a particular speech act because of the content of the
speech). But this kind of as-applied purpose review seems far from universal even within First
Amendment law-for example, see United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 42935 (1993)-and virtually unknown outside it.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 36:4

as I suspect, the justices continue to move away from a vision of rights as
shields for privileged conduct and toward a constitutionalism driven by
notions of permissible and impermissible reasons for government action,
then we can expect to see even more facial adjudication in the years to
come. 143 At all events, it is substantive doctrine, more than any other
factor, that dictates which end of the telescope the Court looks through in a
given case.
Crucially, when substantive constitutional doctrine points the Court
toward facial adjudication, it generally does so for invalidations and
validations alike. To be sure, the Court will usually have powerful
institutional reasons to avoid announcing that a statute is immune from all
future challenges simply because it has survived the present contest, just as
it often has good reasons not to strike down a statute for all times and all
purposes when it vindicates an as-applied challenge. But if the relevant
doctrinal tests mandate a judicial examination of legislative purpose or
some other attribute that operates at the level of the statute, there is no
reason why the resulting decision should not carry over to other
applications. The only way to try to determine whether it does is to gauge,
in classic common-law fashion, the breadth of the Court's holding in light
of the reasoning offered in its opinion. This brings us back to the one
similarity between the two otherwise diametrically opposed visions with
which this Article began: the precise scope of the Court's constitutional
holdings-and consequently the precise location of the boundary they mark
out between the realms of as-applied and facial adjudication-will always
be for future lawyers to argue about and for future cases to decide.

141.

See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505

U.S. 577 (1992).
142. See, e.g., Boumnediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S.
417 (1998).
143. For a radical endorsement of the latter brand of constitutionalism, and therefore of
pervasive facial review, see Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of
American Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1998).

